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THROWING THE E-BOOK AT 
PUBLISHERS: WHAT THE APPLE CASE 






On November 19, 2007, amid much buzz and speculation, 
Amazon—the eminent online retailer—released its first Kindle e-
reader device.1 Less than eight inches in length, and weighing 10.3 
ounces,2 the Kindle contained only a small screen and various 
alphanumeric buttons.3 According to commentators, however, 
Amazon’s little device “revolutionized” the publishing industry4 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; M.A., Columbia University, 
2008; B.A., Bard College, 2004. I wish to thank Rebecca Kaplan for her 
perpetual support, and Raechel Killeen for her fastidious review of this Note’s 
every line and footnote. I am also indebted to the members of the Journal of 
Law and Policy, who have, by dint of some superhuman kindness, spent more 
time working on this project than I have. 
1 RICHARD L. BRANDT, ONE CLICK: JEFF BEZOS AND THE RISE OF 
AMAZON.COM 139  ( 2011); see also Ryan Block, Live from the Amazon Kindle 
Launch Event, ENGADGET (Nov. 19, 2007, 9:23 AM), http://www.engadget.com/ 
2007/11/19/live-from-the-amazon-kindle-launch-event/; Jack Schofield, Amazon 
Will Launch Kindle e-Book Reader on Monday, GUARDIAN TECH. BLOG (Nov. 
18, 2007, 3:33 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2007/nov/18/ 
amazonwilllaunchkindleeboo. 
2 Amazon Kindle 1st-gen, ENGADGET, http://www.engadget.com/products/ 
amazon/kindle/1st-gen/specs/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
3 The Kindle is an electronic reader (“e-reader”), a device on which 
consumers may purchase and read electronic books (“e-books”). E-books are 
like print books, but published in an electronic format. They are easily 
downloaded through retailer Web sites or applications on mobile devices. See 
Complaint at 2, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826), 2012 WL 1193205. 
4 See, e.g., RYAN DEISS, KINDLE PUBLISHING REVOLUTION (2012), 
available at http://www.amazon.com/Kindle-Publishing-Revolution-Amazon-
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and created a burgeoning e-book market.5 The success of the e-
book revolution arose from the Kindle’s unique electronic-ink 
display6 and wireless connectivity.7 Instead of purchasing a 
physical book from a bookshop, or borrowing one from a library, 
users could now connect directly to Amazon and, within seconds, 
download an e-book from a vast selection of electronic files.8 
Perhaps most appealing to consumers, however, was the “cut-rate” 
price of Amazon e-books.9 Despite protests from book publishers, 
Amazon sold new releases for only $9.99,10 well below production 
                                                          
ebook/dp/B008ZRGSY2; Matt Warman, Amazon’s New Kindle and  
a Readers’ Revolution, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 15, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/amazon/8827796/Amazons-new-Kindle-
and-a-readers-revolution.html; Steve Windwalker, Just How Big Is  
the Kindle Revolution?, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 14, 2011, 7:45 PM), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/246700-just-how-big-is-the-kindle-revolution. 
5 Within six months of launching the Kindle, Amazon had sold one 
hundred thousand units. By 2011, the company had sold well over twenty 
million units. See Windwalker, supra note 4. More astoundingly, by 2010, 
Amazon e-books comprised up to twenty percent of sales for major book 
publishers. BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142. 
6 See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 140. The Kindle display, unlike computer 
screens and earlier e-reader devices, used electronic ink (“e-ink”). The e-ink 
display contained millions of “microcapsules” that formed a pleasant white 
background over which darker text appeared. Id. at 140–41. Consumers found e-
ink easier to read for long periods of time than the text on standard computer 
screens. Id. 
7 The Kindle connected to the Internet via a system called Whispernet. 
Schofield, supra note 1. Connectivity allowed users not only to download e-
books in a matter of seconds, but also to subscribe to newspapers and 
magazines. Id. As a result, Amazon Chief Executive Officer Jeff Bezos has 
stated that the Kindle isn’t merely “a device, it’s a service.” Id.  
8 BRANDT, supra note 1, at 140. Before Amazon released the Kindle, most 
e-readers were clunky and expensive, offering only a small selection of 
downloadable titles. Id. at 137–41. Because Amazon began as an online 
“bookstore,” however, the company had existing contracts with large book 
publishers and was able to offer ninety thousand titles upon the Kindle’s release 
in 2007. Id. at 141. 
9 Id. at 142. 
10 Id. See also Competitive Impact Statement at 3, United States v. Apple, 
Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826), 2012 WL 
1193207; Sarah Lacy, Confessions of a Publisher: “We’re in Amazon’s Sights 
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cost.11  
Amazon quickly turned the e-book revolution into a coup. The 
company’s willingness to lose money on e-book sales12 rendered 
the market unattractive to competitors, which uniformly declined 
to participate in a costly price war.13 Thus, by 2012, with a ninety-
percent share of the e-book market,14 Amazon had established an 
effective monopoly.15 Amazon used its new-found dominance to 
force the “Big Six” New York book publishers (“publishers”)16 
                                                          
and They’re Going to Kill Us,” PANDODAILY (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://pandodaily.com/2012/01/17/confessions-of-a-publisher-were-in-amazons-
sights-and-theyre-going-to-kill-us/. 
11 Brief of Bob Kohn as Amicus Curiae at 22, United States v. Apple, Inc., 
889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826). 
12 See Rory Maher, Here’s Why Amazon Will Win The e-Book War: Kindle 
Already Has 90% e-Book Share, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2010, 12:38 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-selling-90-of-all-e-books-2010-1 
(estimating from American Association of Book Publishers’ data that Amazon 
lost $35 million on e-book sales through October 2009); see also Brief of Bob 
Kohn, supra note 11, at 20–21; BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142. 
13 By selling e-books at a loss, Amazon wished to keep competitors “from 
getting a foothold on the virtual bookshelf.” BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142–43. 
The strategy clearly worked. For years, Amazon’s predatory pricing deterred 
competitors like Apple, Google, Barnes & Noble, and Zola Books from entering 
the e-book market. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 640 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
14 See, e.g., Comments of Barnes & Noble, Inc. on the Proposed Final 
Judgment at 9, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826); Michael Hiltzick, Government’s e-Book Case Helps 
Amazon Build Toward a Monopoly, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/12/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20120912; Maher, 
supra note 12; Matt Phillips, Amazon e-Book Share to Fall from 90% to 35%, 
Analysts Say, WSJ MARKETBEAT (Feb. 16, 2010, 10:59 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/02/16/analyst-amazon-e-book-share-to-
fall-from-90-to-35/. 
15 See, e.g., Stacy Mitchell, Justice Department Abets Amazon’s  
e-Book Monopoly, INST. LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (June 20, 2012), 
http://www.ilsr.org/dojs-lawsuit/. 
16 The so-called “Big Six” include Hachette, Harper Collins, Macmillan, 
Penguin, Random House, and Simon & Schuster. Get Published!: Who Are the 
Big Six Publishers?, PRITCHETT, FARLOW, & SMITH PUBLISHERS (Mar. 1, 2011, 
1:39 PM), http://www.pfspublishing.com/workshop/2011/03/get-published-
who-are-the-big-six.html. However, the publishers do not appear all that “big” 
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into continuing to sell e-books cheaply, inspiring concern that 
consumers would become accustomed to untenably low prices.17 
Moreover, Amazon’s predatory tactics created inefficiency in the 
e-book market by spurring overconsumption of e-books at 
artificially low prices. These tactics skewed the e-book demand 
curve18 and threatened the welfare of consumers who, under 
Amazon’s monopoly, would not enjoy the benefits of healthy price 
and product competition in the e-book market.19 Government 
regulators, however, did nothing.20   
In 2009, book publishers took action to curb Amazon’s 
                                                          
alongside retail behemoth Amazon, whose 2011 sales topped $48.08 billion. See 
Donald Melanson, Amazon Announces 2011 Q4 Results: Sales Jump to $17.43 
billion, but Profits Drop 58 percent, ENGADGET (Jan. 31, 2012, 4:26 PM), 
http://www.engadget.com/2012/01/31/amazon-announces-q4-2011-results-sales-
jump-to-17-43-billion/. In comparison, the combined revenue of all six book 
publishers barely topped $10 billion in 2011. Penguin sales totaled $1.71 billion. 
See Penguin Sales Rise 26% on 6% Sales Gains, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Feb. 28, 
2011), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/financial-
reporting/article/46323-penguin-has-record-2010.html. Hachette sales totaled 
$2.64 billion; Random House sales totaled $2.57 billion; Macmillan sales totaled 
$1.9 billion; Harper Collins sales totaled $1.1 billion; and Simon & Schuster 
sales totaled $787 million. See The Global 50: The World’s  
Largest Book Publishers, 2012, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/financial-
reporting/article/52677-the-world-s-54-largest-book-publishers-2012.html.  
17 For instance, when Macmillan refused to abide by Amazon’s pricing 
model, the latter removed MacMillan’s books from its Web site. See BRANDT, 
supra note 1, at 143. See also Christopher Matthews, Should Justice Drop the 
Apple Ebook Lawsuit?, TIME (July 23, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/ 
23/should-justice-drop-the-apple-ebook-lawsuit/ (observing that the shift to an 
agency model was an effort by publishers to prevent Amazon from setting its 
prices too low); Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, 
supra note 3, at 2.  
18 See Christopher R. Leslie, Comment, Achieving Efficiency Through 
Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CALIF. L. 
REV. 243 (1993) (arguing that horizontal price-fixing can help markets function 
more efficiently by ensuring that supply does not grossly exceed demand). 
19 See Comments of Barnes & Noble, Inc. on the Proposed Final Judgment 
at 10, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 
Civ. 2826). 
20 See Mitchell, supra note 15.  
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stranglehold on the e-book market. They devised a plan with 
technology company Apple to stop Amazon’s predatory pricing.21 
At the same time Amazon enjoyed an e-book monopoly, Apple 
was preparing to release its iPad tablet, which functioned as an e-
reader. But Apple, like other retailers, was reluctant to enter the 
Amazon-dominated e-book market.22 Publishers recognized 
Apple’s dilemma as an opportunity both to increase competition 
by helping Apple penetrate the market and to restore economic 
efficiency by ensuring that e-books were no longer sold below 
production cost. In order to effectuate this change, publishers and 
Apple “jointly agreed to alter the business model governing the 
relationship between publishers and retailers.”23  
Until then, retailers had sold print and e-books according to the 
“wholesale” model. Under this model, publishers sold e-book titles 
to wholesale retailers at a fixed price,24 and retailers resold the 
titles to consumers at whatever price they wished.25 In place of the 
wholesale model, Apple and the publishers agreed to institute the 
“agency model.”26 Under the agency model, “publishers would 
take control of retail pricing by appointing retailers as ‘agents.’”27 
Thus, instead of reselling e-books to consumers at any price they 
liked—as Amazon had been doing for years—agent retailers like 
Apple would sell e-book titles at publisher-determined prices. 
These retailers would receive a thirty-percent commission on each 
sale, guaranteeing them a profit28 and precluding losses associated 
with below-cost e-book prices. With Apple entering the market and 
                                                          
21 Complaint, supra note 3, at 3. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24 Under the wholesale model, publishers usually sold books to retailers at 
fifty percent of the print book’s “list price.” See Competitive Impact Statement, 
supra note 10, at 3. 
25 Id. Under this system, an e-book with a list price of $26.00 would be sold 
to Amazon for $13.00. Amazon could in turn sell the title to consumers for 
$9.99—a marginal loss of $3.00. See Brief of Bob Kohn, supra note 11, at 20–
21. 
26 Complaint, supra note 3, at 4. 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
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publishers unanimously resolved to improve pricing, Amazon was 
forced to capitulate to the agency model.29 This shift in model 
addressed the so-called “$9.99 problem”30 and permitted the 
reestablishment of tenable e-book prices—generally between 
$12.99 and $14.99.31  
At last, on April 11, 2012, several years after the establishment 
of Amazon’s pernicious monopoly, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(“the DOJ” or “the government”) finally took action.32 
Unfortunately, however, the government’s intervention defied both 
common logic and popular expectations.33 In a shocking turn, the 
DOJ did not file an antitrust suit against Amazon, as many had 
expected it would.34 Rather, to the utter dismay of the publishing 
industry,35 the government brought charges against five of the Big 
Six book publishers.36 In a complaint filed with the U.S. District 
                                                          
29 Id. at 16, 25–28. 
30 Id. at 9–11.   
31 Id. at 5.  
32 See Complaint, supra note 3. 
33 See, e.g., Thomas Catan et al., U.S. Alleges e-Book  
Scheme, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702304444604577337573054615152.html; Ylan Q. Mui & 
Hayley Tsukayama, Justice Department Sues Apple, Publishers Over e-Book 
Prices, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/justice-department-files-suit-against-apple-publishers-report-
says/2012/04/11/gIQAzyXSAT_story.html; Elizabeth Wasserman, DOJ Sues 
Apple, Publishers On e-Book Prices, POLITICO (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/75028.html. 
34 Many critics believe that the DOJ filed suit against the wrong party. For 
example, publishing industry analyst Mike Shatzkin noted, “It is an incredible 
irony that antitrust law is being used to protect the biggest monopolist.” John 
Gapper, Don’t Make Amazon a Monopoly, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed2a1b20-2644-11e1-9ed3-00144feabdc0.html. In an 
amicus brief to the district court, attorney Bob Kohn requested that the DOJ 
release its report on Amazon’s predatory pricing tactics.  See Laura Hazard 
Owen, Attorney Asks DOJ to Release Findings on Amazon’s  
“Predatory” Ebook Pricing, PAIDCONTENT (Aug. 13, 2012, 1:06 PM), 
http://paidcontent.org/2012/08/13/attorney-asks-doj-to-release-its-findings-on-
amazons-predatory-pricing-of-ebooks/. 
35 See Gapper, supra note 34; Owen, supra note 34. 
36 See Complaint, supra note 3. Of the “Big Six” publishers, only Random 
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Court for the Southern District of New York, the DOJ claimed that 
publishers illegally conspired with e-book retailer Apple to “limit 
competition in the sale of e-books.”37 This, however, was a gross 
mischaracterization of both the motive and the effect of the 
publishers’ conduct. In its misapplication of antitrust law, the DOJ 
demonstrated not only a lack of understanding of the emerging e-
book market, but also an appalling unfamiliarity with modern 
economic theory.  
Still more shocking was the warm reception afforded by the 
United States District Court to the DOJ’s flawed antitrust 
argument. Even before United States v. Apple, Inc.38 went to trial, 
Judge Denise Cote announced in a preliminary hearing that she 
believed the DOJ would prevail.39 The court’s pointed 
prognostication augured poorly for the book publishers. Faced with 
the prospect of hopeless litigation and a predetermined outcome, 
each publisher eventually settled out of court—leaving only Apple 
to defend itself.40 On July 10, 2013, following several weeks of a 
                                                          
House escaped suit. See id. 
37 Id. at 2. 
38 United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
39 See Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, U.S. Judge in E-Book Antitrust Trial Says 
Apple is Likely to Lose, CNN (May 24, 2013, 8:05 AM), 
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/05/24/apple-ebooks-antitrust-judge/. Judge 
Cote, hardly encouraging publishers to seek their day in court, stated: “I believe 
that the government will be able to show at trial direct evidence that Apple 
knowingly participated in and facilitated a conspiracy to raise prices of e-books, 
and that the circumstantial evidence in this case, including the terms of the 
agreements, will confirm that.” Id.  
40 Of the five publisher defendants charged in the DOJ complaint, Hachette, 
HarperCollins, and Simon & Schuster settled almost immediately. See Apple, 
Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 626. The remaining publishers—Penguin and 
Macmillan—eventually conceded to crushing settlement agreements. See 
Andrew Albanese, Macmillan E-Book Settlement, Will Pay $26 Million, 
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/ 
pw/by-topic/digital/content-and-e-books/article/57013-macmillan-finalizes-e-
book-settlement-will-pay-26-million.html; Julie Bosman, Penguin to Pay $75 
Million in E-Book Settlement with States, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/business/media/penguin-to-pay-75-
million-in-e-book-settlement-with-states.html [hereinafter Bosman, Penguin to 
Pay]. 
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contentious trial, Judge Cote issued her decision.41 The District 
Court held that “Apple had illegally conspired with five of the six 
biggest publishers to try to raise prices in the budding e-books 
market.”42 Before the case went to trial, such a notion—that 
publishers broke the law by correcting the artificial decline of e-
book prices—might have been unthinkable. But what many 
commentators found a shocking judicial determination in light of 
Amazon’s e-book monopoly had, by the end of the Apple trial, 
come to be seen as a foregone conclusion.   
The District Court’s conclusion in United States v. Apple, Inc. 
is misguided. When properly analyzed, nothing in the factual 
history of the case suggested that Apple or the book publishers 
acted improperly. Moreover, the DOJ’s suit against the defendants 
was based on faulty grounds. The DOJ argued that publishers 
harmed consumers by increasing the prices of e-books above the 
artificially low point created by Amazon.43 In order to “effectuate 
their conspiracy,”44 the DOJ contended, publishers entered into 
two types of business arrangements that are often the subject of 
antitrust law. First, in establishing the agency model, publishers 
effectuated a “vertical arrangement” with Apple.45 An arrangement 
is vertical “when it links two markets in the same chain of 
manufacture and distribution, usually through the linkage of two 
firms that either do or could stand in the relationship of supplier 
and customer.”46 In this case, the agency model created a vertical 
                                                          
41 United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 2826, 2013 WL 3454986 
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013).  
42 David Streitfeld, E-Book Ruling Gives Amazon an Advantage, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/e-book-
ruling-gives-amazon-an-advantage.html [hereinafter Streitfeld, E-Book Ruling]. 
43 The government contends that “the goal of antitrust law . . . is to keep 
prices low for consumers’ benefit.” Response of Plaintiff United States to Public 
Comments on the Proposed Final Judgment at 21, United States v. Apple, Inc., 
889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826) (citation omitted). The 
“low price” principle, however, is completely unfounded in antitrust 
jurisprudence. 
44 Complaint, supra note 3 at 2. 
45 See id. at 2, 6–7, 16–30. 
46 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 18 (The Free Press 1993) 
(1978). 
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arrangement between the publishers (suppliers) and Apple 
(customer). The fact that book publishers and Apple agreed to sell 
e-books at certain predetermined prices constituted a “retail-price 
restraint,”47 conduct that is widely presumed to be legal.48 Such 
restraints are typically reviewed under “the rule of reason” 
standard, whereby courts consider not only the restraint itself, but 
its context, purpose and effect.49 
Second, according to the DOJ, publishers entered into a 
“horizontal arrangement” with one another when they 
communicated about setting new above-cost e-book prices.50 A 
horizontal arrangement describes conduct by rivals in a single 
market—in this case, the five publishers in the e-book market—
and often concerns price-setting.51 According to the DOJ, under 
current antitrust doctrine, horizontal price-setting of any kind is 
presumed to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act,52 the 
quintessential antitrust statute. This means that, unlike the vertical 
retail-price restraint on e-books established between publishers and 
Apple, the horizontal price agreement among publishers would be 
evaluated under the per se illegal (the “per se”) standard.53  
The horizontal arrangement among publishers, therefore, was 
the central issue in United States v. Apple, Inc. Pursuant to the per 
se standard, defendants were not permitted to expound upon the 
nature of their industry or their reasons for entering a horizontal 
                                                          
47 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878 
(2007) (“The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for 
other vertical restraints. Minimum resale price maintenance can stimulate 
interbrand competition among manufacturers selling different brands of the 
same type of product by reducing intrabrand competition among retailers selling 
the same brand.”). 
48 See JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 1:10 (2d ed.). See also Leegin, 551 U.S. at 
877 (finding a vertical retail price restraint to be legal). 
49 Leslie, supra note 18, at 247. 
50 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 18–26. The DOJ alleged that publishing 
executives engaged in numerous phone conversations and meetings in order to 
establish the agency model and combat Amazon’s predatory pricing. Id. at 12. 
51 BORK, supra note 46, at 17–18. 
52 Complaint, supra note 3, at 32. 
53 Id. 
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arrangement.54 Therefore, although the Apple case presented 
complicated facts concerning a unique and changing industry, not 
to mention the circumstances of Amazon’s monopoly, the court 
gave publishers and Apple little opportunity to explain their 
conduct. Because the publishers, like Apple, would have been 
summarily found guilty of price fixing, it is no surprise that they 
resigned themselves to unfavorable settlement agreements. Not 
only have they agreed to abandon the robust agency model, but 
publishers must pay enormous fines. Penguin Group, for instance, 
resolved to pay $75 million in “consumer damages” rather than go 
before a federal judge who had already determined its fate.55   
This Note contends that contemporary antitrust policy is built 
upon shaky doctrinal ground and must be reevaluated. The fact that 
it is per se illegal, under current law, for book publishers to attempt 
to stop Amazon’s predatory tactics demonstrates that U.S. antitrust 
policy is in a sad state of disrepair.56 Still more upsetting is the fact 
that, under the per se standard, publishers have been dissuaded 
from telling their story to the court. Accordingly, the United States 
v. Apple, Inc. decision presents a vital opportunity to reexamine 
our antitrust law. In short, the type of horizontal arrangements at 
the center of United States v. Apple, Inc. ought to be evaluated not 
only under the rule of reason, but under a new, updated three-
prong rule of reason test that incorporates modern economic 
theory.57  
                                                          
54 Id.  
55 Bosman, Penguin to Pay, supra note 40. 
56 One need only read the 800 public comments written in opposition to this 
case to understand the outrage and confusion the DOJ’s lawsuit has caused 
among authors, independent publishers, and booksellers. See Antitrust  
Division: United States v. Apple, Inc., et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/apple/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
57 This theory will draw from two primary sources. First is the basic tenets 
of the Chicago School of Economics, as espoused by Bork in his seminal book 
on antitrust law, which value economic efficiency in a market above all else. See 
generally BORK, supra note 46. The second source is the so-called “theory of the 
second best,” which suggests that one failure in a particular market may be 
corrected by a second failure. R.G. Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster, The General 
Theory of Second Best, in READINGS IN SOCIAL WELFARE: THEORY AND POLICY 
47, 48 (Robert Kuenne ed., 2000). 
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As background, Part I provides a brief history of antitrust law.  
Part I.A recounts the emergence of the law’s governing 
standards—the traditional per se and the rule-of-reason 
standards—while Part I.B identifies some of the fallacious ideas 
that continue to plague antitrust law. Part II describes two positive 
trends in antitrust law arising from modern economic theory that 
support the adoption of a new, updated three-prong rule of reason. 
The first is a move away from per se analysis; the second is a 
growing realization that economic efficiency is the best measure of 
antitrust policy and the most effective way to promote consumer 
welfare. Part III reviews Supreme Court precedent supporting the 
argument that, in United States v. Apple, Inc., publishers’ 
horizontal arrangement should have been analyzed under a general 
test pursuant to the rule of reason standard. Part IV sets forth a new 
specific three-part economic-effects test for horizontal 
arrangements, whereby an arrangement may be found legal when 
(1) the relevant economic market is unfamiliar or unique, (2) the 
horizontal arrangement is ancillary to a proper aim, and (3) the 
arrangement improves economic efficiency. The Note concludes 
that under this new standard the publishers’ horizontal arrangement 
in United States v. Apple, Inc. should be found legal upon appeal.  
In United States v. Apple, Inc., the DOJ and the District Court 
harmed both the publishing industry and modern antitrust-law 
policy. “The Department of Justice has unwittingly caused further 
consolidation in the industry at a time when consolidation is not 
necessarily a good thing,” said Mark Coker, the chief executive of 
an e-book distributor. “If you want a vibrant ecosystem of multiple 
publishers, multiple publishing methods and multiple successful 
retailers in 5, 20 or 50 years, we took a step backwards [with the 
District Court’s decision].”58 While both Apple and the publishers 
were punished by the court, Amazon has been left to reestablish its 
monopoly over the e-book market through predatory pricing.59 But 
there is still hope. Recent reports suggest that Apple plans to 
appeal the District Court’s decision.60 Thus, the U.S. Court of 
                                                          
58 Streitfeld, E-Book Ruling, supra note 42.  
59 Id.  
60 Blair Hanley Frank, Apple Loses E-books Antitrust Case, but Vows to 
Appeal, GEEKWIRE (July 10, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2013/ 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit—and perhaps even the U.S. 
Supreme Court—will be given an opportunity to address the dire 
state of contemporary antitrust law. Should the higher courts 
reconsider their policy in light of modern economic theory, it is 
possible that the next decision in United States v. Apple, Inc. will 
be the right one.  
 
I. THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAW 
 
On July 2, 1890, President Benjamin Harrison signed into law 
Bill S. I, later called the Sherman Act.61 The “oldest and most basic 
of the antitrust statutes,”62 the Act originally comprised only two 
terse sections. Its plain language, however, was expansive in 
scope: 
Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal.63 
 
Section 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine and conspire 
with any other person, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor. . . .64 
The breadth of the text gave earlier federal courts considerable 
discretion in determining subsidiary antitrust laws.65 This could 
                                                          
apple-loses-ebook-antitrust-case/. 
61 BORK, supra note 46, at 19. 
62 Id. at 61. 
63 Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1890)). 
64 Id. at 20 (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 2). In subsequent versions of Section 2, 
“misdemeanor” was replaced with “felony.” See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
65
 BORK, supra note 46, at 20. See also WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA 
MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:9 (2012) (“Taken literally, 
[the] extremely broad language [of Section 1] would prohibit virtually any 
business combination or agreement, including competitively desirable as well as 
undesirable arrangements. Not surprisingly, the courts have interpreted the 
statute far more narrowly . . . .”).  
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hardly have been considered problematic, as the goal of the 
Sherman Act might have appeared clear enough.66 The statute 
would promote consumer welfare by preventing the formation of 
harmful business arrangements and ensuring healthy market 
competition.67 Specifically, Section 1 precluded horizontal 
arrangements, like cartels and mergers,68 while Section 2 
prohibited the formation of monopolies through predatory tactics.69 
The Sherman Act thus had a simple purpose with a clear 
application.  
One hundred and twenty-two years later, this has proven not to 
be the case. Today’s antitrust policy is muddled at best. The 
purpose of the Sherman Act is frequently misplaced;70 indeed, one 
need look no further than the DOJ’s incorrect claim, in United 
States v. Apple, Inc., that the goal of antitrust law is to ensure the 
lowest price of goods.71 Despite its terseness, the “singularly 
                                                          
66 Even so, Judge Richard Posner suggests that the framers approached the 
law with contradictory aims. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 34 (2d 
ed. 2001). On the one hand, they were concerned with trusts and monopolies 
harming smaller businesses with predatory pricing; on the other hand, they 
wished to prevent powerful businesses from harming customers with high 
prices. Id. In the end, “[p]rotecting competitors from low prices and consumers 
from high prices are incompatible objectives . . . .” Id. 
67 See BORK, supra note 46, at 17; see also United States v. Addyston Pipe 
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (finding that contracts legal pursuant 
to the Sherman Act are upheld “because it is for the benefit of the public at large 
that they should be enforced”), aff’d as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The 
Supreme Court later determined “that that the Sherman Act only invalidated 
those agreements which ‘unreasonably’ restrain trade. The Court defined the 
term ‘unreasonable’ by equating it with ‘anticompetitive.’ Consequently, the 
effect on competition soon became the primary, if not sole, focus determining 
the reasonableness of a challenged trade restraint.” Leslie, supra note 18, at 245 
(citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)). 
68 BORK, supra note 46, at 19–20. 
69 Id. at 20. 
70 See, e.g., id. at 16–49 (describing, inter alia, the missteps of Justice 
Hughes). 
71 See Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments, supra note 
43, at 21. As we will see, the true goal of antitrust policy is the promotion of 
consumer welfare through increased economic efficiency (and not, as the 
government claimed in the Apple case, the lowest price of goods).  
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opaque”72 language of the Sherman Act has given rise to 
inconsistent precedent.73  This is due, in large part, to the courts’ 
failure to apply reliable and consistent doctrines to the statute’s 
bare language. As Professor Andrew Gavill has quipped, “After 
one hundred years one might expect a rule of law to be settled.”74 
But apparently this is expecting too much. The courts have 
muddied the waters of antitrust jurisprudence, and, before we 
attempt to clear things up, the turgidity is worth examining. 
  
A. Early Antitrust Law: Per Se Illegality and the Rule of 
Reason 
 
As Judge Posner laments, antitrust law has always suffered 
from a rather “confusing history.”75 Its progress, however, is 
marked by at least one persistent theme: the ongoing tension 
between the rule of per se illegality and the rule of reason.76 Both 
are standards by which the courts evaluate alleged Sherman Act 
violations. The per se rule is a black-letter prohibition on specific 
types of business arrangements.77 These business arrangements 
traditionally govern restraints that are purely anticompetitive; thus, 
                                                          
72 BORK, supra note 46, at 20. 
73 Id. at 17. 
74 Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The 
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733 (2012). 
75  POSNER, supra note 66, at 34 n.5. 
76 The Supreme Court has since noted that the per se rule and the rule of 
reason in fact occupy two ends of the same spectrum. See Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) 
(“[N]o bright line separat[es] per se from Rule of Reason analysis.”); see also 
HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 65, § 2:9 (“The distinction between 
practices deemed per se illegal, and those that are instead to be judged by the 
rule of reason or by some intermediate standard, is anything but immutable. . . . 
[P]ractices that have at one time been analyzed under one test have later been 
brought under an altogether different standard.”); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., 
Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1769 (1994) [hereinafter Piraino, Making 
Sense of the Rule of Reason] (“The courts can clarify Section 1 analysis by 
recognizing that the rule of reason and per se rules are not opposite theoretical 
approaches but simply different evidentiary standards.”). 
77 Leslie, supra note 18, at 245. 
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in order for the government to justify a per se prohibition, such a 
restraint must “lack any redeeming virtue.”78 When a particular 
restraint falls within the per se category, it is deemed unreasonable 
as a matter of law;79 thus, courts do not consider its context, 
purpose, or effect on the economic market. A number of 
restraints—including group boycotts, tying arrangements, and the 
division of markets—have been deemed per se illegal by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.80 It is the type of horizontal price-fixing at the 
center of United States v. Apple, Inc., however, that is considered 
the “epitome of a per se violation.”81 
The traditional rule of reason, on the other hand, constitutes a 
more nuanced analysis of business conduct. It requires that courts 
consider not only the trade restraint itself, but its context, purpose, 
and effect.82 This means evaluating the nature of the industry, the 
reasons that the restraint was imposed, and whether or not it has 
had the desired consequence.83 Through an economic effects test, a 
“court may determine that the procompetitive benefits of a specific 
restraint outweigh its anticompetitive effects and, accordingly, 
allow it to survive the rule of reason.”84 
Both standards first surfaced in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass’n,85 an early antitrust case concerning a 
conspiracy among railroad operators to establish fixed rates.86  
                                                          
78 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 
(2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
79 See Leslie, supra note 18, at 245. 
80 Id. at 246. 
81 Id.; see also United States v. Sacony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 
(1940) (finding per se illegal any “combination formed for the purpose and with 
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a 
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce”). 
82 See Leslie, supra note 18, at 247. 
83 See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
84 Leslie, supra note 18, at 247. 
85 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
86 Id. at 299. Led by Justice Peckham, the Supreme Court struck down the 
arrangement and “framed a rule of per se illegality for cartel price fixing.”  
BORK, supra note 46, at 23.  One may argue that the per se rule arose from a 
broad reading of Section 1 of the Sherman Act: if an arrangement is 
overwhelmingly likely to restrict trade, then all similar arrangements are 
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Employing the per se rule, the majority proposed a predictable way 
to appraise horizontal arrangements that obviated the need for 
intricate economic analysis.87 Thus, the majority in Trans-Missouri 
implicitly rejected a rule of reason standard,88 though Justice White 
proposed precisely that standard in his dissent.89 In a narrower 
reading of the Sherman Act, White argued that “only such 
contracts as unreasonably restrain trade are violative of the general 
law . . . .” 90 Thus, by butting heads with the majority, White set in 
motion the defining debate of antitrust law.  
This debate amplified in 1898, when Judge Taft, in United 
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, Co., dialed back the expansive per 
se rule. He did so with a seemingly counterintuitive proclamation: 
“[I]t is in the interest of trade that certain covenants in restraint of 
trade should be enforced.”91 The Addyston case, like Trans-
                                                          
assumed to be illegal.  
87 In carving out a category of illegal conduct, the Court preferred a hatchet 
to a scalpel. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here 
are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise 
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per 
se unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and 
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved 
. . . .”). See also BORK, supra note 46, at 26 (“[Peckham’s] rejection of a 
reasonable-price standard of legality may have saved the [Sherman Act] from 
becoming a judicially administered version of the National Recovery 
Administration, allowing cartels but policing their prices and behavior.”). 
88 Justice Peckham, like Chief Justice Taft after him, cautioned that “[i]f 
only that kind of contract which is in unreasonable restraint of trade be within 
the meaning of the statute, and declared therein to be illegal, it is at once 
apparent that the subject of what is a reasonable rate is attended with great 
uncertainty.” Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 331. See also Standard Oil Co. of N.J.  
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) (As per se illegal arrangements “were 
clearly restraints of trade within the purview of the statute, they could not be 
taken out of that category by indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency 
or nonexpediency of having made the contracts, or the wisdom or want of 
wisdom of the statute which prohibited their being made.”). 
89 Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 343–74 (White, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 344. 
91 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 
1898). 
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Missouri Freight, concerned horizontal price restrictions—this 
time established by six manufacturers of cast iron pipe.92 Taft 
recognized that seemingly anticompetitive arrangements, which 
would typically fall into the per se illegal category, were 
sometimes beneficial. He reasoned, for instance, that a restraint is 
permissible if it is ancillary to a lawful contract.93 To qualify as 
“ancillary,” a restraint “eliminating competition must be 
subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction.”94 
For instance, Taft reasoned, a restraint is ancillary—and therefore 
lawful—when it acts only to protect one party from the unchecked 
competition of a competitor.95 By introducing the doctrine of 
ancillary restraints, “Taft recognized that some restrictions upon 
rivalry are socially valuable”96 and thus limited the number of 
business arrangements that fell under per se restrictions.97 This 
loosening of the per se rule had the effect of encouraging 
beneficial agreements and promoting the original goal of antitrust 
policy: consumer welfare.98  
Justice White articulated a revised rule of reason in two 
companion opinions written in 1911—this time writing for the 
                                                          
92 Id. at 272–74. 
93 Id. at 282. Chief Justice Taft states that “no conventional restraint of 
trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to 
the main purpose of a lawful contract . . . .” Id. Taft thus demonstrated that the 
per se rule and the rule of reason might peaceably coexist, proposing “a rule of 
per se illegality for what have been called ‘naked restraints,’ agreements in 
which the parties engage in no significant dealings other than the elimination of 
competition,” and a rule of reason when ancillary restraints eliminate 
competition as a means of creating efficiency. BORK, supra note 46, at 27. 
94 BORK, supra note 46, at 27.  
95 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282. 
96 BORK, supra note 46, at 27. 
97 Chief Justice Taft’s ancillary-restraints doctrine “would validate all 
vertical arrangements.” Id. at 29. 
98 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281 (“Contracts for the partial restraint of trade 
are upheld, not because they are advantageous to the individual with whom the 
contract is made, and a sacrifice pro tanto of the rights of the community, but 
because it is for the benefit of the public at large that they should be enforced.”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Court’s majority.99 Both Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United 
States and United States v. American Tobacco Co. reconfirmed 
that the Sherman Act’s goal is the “maximization of consumer 
welfare.”100 Under White’s revised rule of reason, the Court had to 
weigh certain factors before determining whether a restraint of 
trade was per se illegal or whether it merited closer analysis.101 
Toward this end, White proposed what would become the standard 
three-prong economic-effects test.102 First, under the “inherent 
nature” prong, which incorporates the per se standard, the court 
determines whether an activity is presumed illegal.103 Second, if 
the activity falls outside of the per se illegal category, the Court 
inquires as to its “inherent effect.”104 Finally, the court considers 
the “evident purpose” of the activity.105 This three-prong 
economic-effects test would come to dominate Supreme Court 
                                                          
99 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–62 (1911); 
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179–80 (1911).  
100 BORK, supra note 46, at 34. 
101 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63. By emphasizing the importance of reason, 
Justice White found that “judgment must in every case be called into play in 
order to determine whether a particular act is embraced within the statutory 
classes, and whether, if the act is within such classes, its nature or effect causes 
it to be a restraint of trade within the intendment of the act.” Id. 
102 American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179 (“Applying the rule of reason to the 
construction of the statute, it was held in the Standard Oil Case that, as the 
words ‘restraint of trade’ at common law and in the law of this country at the 
time of the adoption of the anti-trust act only embraced acts or contracts or 
agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public 
interests by unduly restricting competition, or unduly obstructing the due course 
of trade, or which, either because of their inherent nature or effect, or because of 
the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the words 
as used in the statute were designed to have and did have but a like 
significance.”). See also BORK, supra note 46, at 34. Though not explicitly 
stated, the three-part test in Standard Oil comprises: the “[1] inherent nature or 
[2] effect of the restraint, as well as [3] the evident purpose of the acts . . . .”  Id. 
at 36. 
103 BORK, supra note 46, at 36. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 18–19, 36 (“Behavior not placed in the per se category is properly 
judged by the criteria of the intent which accompanies it and its probable effect 
upon competition.”). 
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rule-of-reason jurisprudence over the next century.106  
This traditional three-part test also laid the foundation for 
Justice Brandeis’ quintessential opinion in Board of Trade of City 
of Chicago v. United States.107 The case concerned the Board of 
Trade’s prohibition on grain sales between certain hours of the 
day.108 Because the prices of grains temporarily remained constant, 
the effect of this conduct amounted to a limited type of price 
fixing.109 The Court, nonetheless, sustained the restriction on the 
grain sales.110 Justice Brandeis, expanding upon the rule of reason 
proffered earlier by Justices White and Taft, found that price fixing 
could sometimes improve market conditions.111 He then articulated 
what many have called the “classic formulation of the rule of 
reason:”112  
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot 
be determined by so simple a test, as whether it 
restrains competition. Every agreement concerning 
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, 
to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of 
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as 
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
                                                          
106 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 
(1984) (emphasizing “market impact” and “economic effect” of restraint); 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) 
(focusing “on whether the effect . . . threaten[s] the proper operation of our 
predominantly free-market economy”); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977) (“[D]eparture from the rule-of-reason standard must 
be based upon demonstrable economic effect . . . .”); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 368 (1933) (“The more serious question relates to 
the effect of the plan upon competition between defendants and other 
producers.”), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 
U.S. 752 (1984); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) 
(under the rule of reason, courts must examine “the nature of the restraint and its 
effect, actual or probable”).  
107 Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 231.  
108 Id. at 237, 239–40. 
109 Leslie, supra note 18, at 260–61. 
110 Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 241. 
111 BORK, supra note 46, at 43. 
112 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1761. 
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competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition. To determine that 
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is 
applied; its condition before and after the restraint 
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its 
effect, actual or probable. The history of the 
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for 
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is 
not because a good intention will save an otherwise 
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because 
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret 
facts and to predict consequences.113  
This passage is important for several reasons. First, it promotes 
the ancillary restraint doctrine articulated by Taft and described 
above. Like Taft and White, Brandeis knew “that restraints on 
competition may often be a valuable and integral part of business 
arrangements, and that not all restraints should be condemned.”114 
Second, by allowing courts to sustain arrangements that benefit the 
market, Brandeis also helped flesh out the standard three-prong 
economic-effects test introduced by White.115 Compared to 
previous versions of the rule of reason, Brandeis’ analysis was 
especially fact-intensive. His analysis permitted courts to look 
beyond competition and to consider circumstances peculiar to the 
industry in question. While the opinion did not explicitly reject a 
per se illegal category of conduct, at least one commentator has 
noted its absence from the text.116 Taken as a whole, the Board of 
Trade decision suggests that Brandeis favored a presumption of 
                                                          
113 Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238. 
114 Gavil, supra note 74, at 742. 
115 See id. at 742–43 (“[The Chicago Board opinion] intuitively focused on 
the issues that lie at the core of the rule of reason inquiry and always have: the 
nature of the conduct, its purpose, and, perhaps most importantly, ‘its effect[s], 
actual or probable.’”) (citation omitted). 
116 BORK, supra note 46, at 44 (“Most significant, perhaps, is his entire 
omission of any suggestion that there exists any category of restraints illegal per 
se.”).  




B. The Pitfalls of Early Antitrust Law and Their Effect Today 
 
Justice Hughes’ 1911 opinion in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John 
D. Park & Sons Co.118 exemplifies the Court’s frustrating tendency 
to undermine whatever progress it has made toward promoting a 
consistent rule of reason. Wishing to prevent price-cutting, Dr. 
Miles, a manufacturer of patent medicines, entered into an agency 
pricing agreement with its distributors.119 Through this 
arrangement, Dr. Miles was able to maintain uniform retail prices 
for its products.120 Thus, this vertical retail-price restraint’s only 
real economic effect was to prevent predatory pricing by 
distributors. The Supreme Court, however, viewed the vertical 
arrangement as a per se violation of the Sherman Act.121 Justice 
Hughes stated that Dr. Miles “can fare no better with its plan of 
identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed 
a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions, 
and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each 
other.”122 The Court thus effectively conflated horizontal price 
arrangements with vertical retail-price arrangements,123 punishing 
                                                          
117 Under a presumption of reasonableness, the government must 
demonstrate a restraint’s negative effect on the market before it could be deemed 
illegal. See id. at 46. 
118 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), 
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 
(2007).  
119 Id. at 374–93. 
120 Id. at 374–75. 
121 Id. at 400–09. 
122 Id. at 408.  
123 Judge Posner points out, with some dismay, that the Court justifies its 
odd theory with the bald assertion: “[t]hat these agreements restrain trade is 
obvious.” Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An 
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential 
Competition Decisions, 75 COL. L. REV. 282, 286 (1975) [hereinafter Posner, 
Antitrust Policy] (internal quotation marks omitted). The injury done by Dr. 
Miles is, of course, not “obvious.” Like too much antitrust law, the Court’s 
disapproval of vertical arrangements—along with price-fixing and horizontal 
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the manufacturer Dr. Miles for precluding retailers from selling its 
products at below-cost prices. The law of vertical retail-price 
maintenance was thereby “rendered mischievous and arbitrary”124 
and would not be remedied until Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. finally overruled Dr. Miles in 2007.125  
Even so, antitrust policy today sometimes seems just as 
muddled as it did in 1911. In United States v. Apple, Inc., for 
example, the DOJ charged publishers with entering an “illegal 
agreement” precluding predatory pricing.126 This appears to be just 
another way of railing against vertical retail-price maintenance—in 
this case, the agency model—conduct that, since Leegin, should be 
considered legal.127 Moreover, as a punitive measure, the District 
Court prohibited publishers from setting the retail prices of their e-
books for a period of two years.128 Again, the target of the court’s 
judgment is a vertical arrangement that is presumed legal. Thus, 
like Dr. Miles, the Apple decision undermines manufacturers’ 
ability to protect their products from predatory pricing by retailers. 
Held side by side, Dr. Miles and Apple, Inc. appear eerily similar 
to one another; both cases reveal the courts’ conflation of 
horizontal and vertical restraints, as well as their continuing—but 
unfounded—contempt for effective vertical retail-price restraints. 
                                                          
arrangements—rests on various misperceptions. See also BORK, supra note 46, 
at 16 (“Never has ‘experience’ demonstrated the anticompetitive nature of any 
of these practices.”).  
124 BORK, supra note 46, at 32. 
125 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 
(2007). Much like Dr. Miles, the Leegin case concerned a manufacturer that 
restricted the prices at which retailers could sell its goods by refusing to sell its 
products to those retailers that did not abide by the vertical retail-price restraint. 
Id. at 883. Instead of finding this type of vertical price restraint illegal, however, 
the Court declared “[w]e now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that 
vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason.” Id. at 882. 
126 Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 8. 
127 That vertical and horizontal restraints lead to the same outcome, yet one 
is still considered legal while the other is not, should tell us something about the 
uncertainty inherent in antitrust policy. 
128 See Final Judgment as to Defendants Hachette, Harper Collins, and 
Simon & Schuster at 10, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826). 
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By ruling against the book publishers simply because their agency 
model “achieve[d] the same result”129 as retailer collusion, the 
District Court made the same mistake committed by the Supreme 
Court in Dr. Miles a hundred years ago.  
Cases like Dr. Miles are instructive. They reveal that the 
Supreme Court has made some poor decisions resulting in shaky 
distinctions between cause and effect, evincing an infirm 
understanding of modern economic theory. These decisions have 
hobbled other courts as they handle cases like Apple, Inc. Yet, 
strangely, the problematic history of antitrust law is a cause for 
optimism. Cases like Leegin show that old errors can be resolved, 
and, moreover, that the Sherman Act “has a generality and 
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in 
constitutional provisions.”130 This means that the law is apt to 
improve; courts can rid themselves of some old bugaboos (like 
discomfort with retail-price restraints) and, as a result, United 
States v. Apple, Inc. can be properly resolved. 
 
II. TWO POSITIVE TRENDS IN MODERN ANTITRUST LAW  
 
The Court has increasingly begun to recognize economic 
efficiency as the true measure of antitrust policy.131 This is 
                                                          
129 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007). 
130 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933). See 
also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64 (1911) (noting that 
the Sherman Act was “expressly designed not to unduly limit the application of 
the act by precise definition, but, while clearly fixing a standard, that is, by 
defining the ulterior boundaries which could not be transgressed with impunity, 
to leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided by the principles of 
law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the statute, 
in every given case whether any particular act or contract was within the 
contemplation of the statute.”); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard 
and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. 
L.J. 345, 346 (2007) [hereinafter Piraino, Reconciling Harvard and Chicago 
Schools] (“Over the 115 years since the adoption of the Sherman Act, the courts 
and enforcement agencies have altered their interpretation of the antitrust laws 
to match prevailing economic assumptions.”). 
131 Leslie, supra note 18, at 244. 
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underscored by two important trends that have emerged in modern 
antitrust law. The first constitutes a steady move away from per se 
illegality and toward the traditional economic-effects test under the 
rule of reason.132 The second trend is a growing realization that 
market competition is not the only indicator of the successful 
application of antitrust law. When viewed together, both trends 
undermine the District Court’s decision in United States v. Apple, 
Inc. Instead they indicate that the horizontal price-fixing 
arrangement between publishers is indeed permissible under the 
rule of reason because it increases efficiency in the e-book market.  
 
A. The Shift from Per Se Illegality to Rule of Reason Analysis 
 
Over time “there has been a general trend away from per se 
rules toward greater application of the standard rule of reason.”133 
Thus, some commentators recognize that “the rule of reason now 
has become the dominant form of analysis in Section 1 cases.”134 
The best explanation for this trend is the promulgation of modern 
economic theory.135 Until the late 1960s, before the emergence of 
the so-called Chicago School of economics, “courts were 
enamored of the clarity, simplicity, and deterrent effects of per se 
rules.”136 The application of the per se rule “reached its peak in 
1967 when, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., the 
[Supreme] Court extended [it] to nonprice vertical restrictions 
imposed by a supplier on its distributors.”137 This decision marked 
the height of the mistaken belief, rooted in Dr. Miles and persistent 
today, that all vertical restraints are per se illegal.  
As economic theory has advanced, however, “the courts have 
grown disillusioned with the absolutism of the per se rule and have 
been more inclined to consider efficiency justifications for 
                                                          
132 See id. at 247–48. 
133 Id. 
134 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1760. 
135 See Leslie, supra note 18, at 289–90 (explaining that application of per 
se rules became insufficient in price-fixing cases of the 1980s, leading the 
Supreme Court to adopt in-depth analysis closer to rule-of-reason analysis). 
136 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1753–54. 
137 Id. at 1756. 
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competitive restraints.”138 For example, the modern Supreme Court 
has noted that per se analysis “may sometimes prohibit restraints of 
trade that are harmless, efficient, competitive, or otherwise 
beneficial.”139 Even outspoken proponents of the per se rule have 
conceded that it may have outlived its usefulness,140 as a rule that 
is meant to be applied indiscriminately loses its value whenever it 
does not produce the correct result. Consequently, “the courts have 
narrowed the scope of the per se rule and expanded applications of 
the rule of reason.”141 Rather than using a hatchet to carve out 
antitrust policy, courts now prefer a scalpel: an economic-effects 
test based on the tests articulated by Justices White and 
Brandeis.142 To put it another way, “if the goal of the per se rule 
[was] to avoid discussion of economic efficiencies, it has 
failed.”143 The retreat away from per se analysis is nicely 
demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s gradual disavowal of the 
reasoning in Dr. Miles.144 Not only does this suggest that the Court 
                                                          
138 Id. at 1754. 
139 Leslie, supra note 18, at 246 & n.13 (“The administrative efficiency 
interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling.” (quoting F.T.C. v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990))).  
140 Professor Bork, for instance, concedes that while it has done some good, 
“it is also true that the [per se] rule has become somewhat skewed over time, and 
on occasion produces undesirable results.” BORK, supra note 46, at 263. 
141 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1754. 
142 See Gavil, supra note 74, at 734 (“The rule of reason has evolved 
considerably since Standard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade, largely due to the 
Court’s own march away from per se rules and undemanding burdens of proof. 
As that march began in the late 1970s, the Court moved to add contemporary 
economic content to the broad principles articulated in Chicago Board of Trade. 
In formative cases like Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.; National 
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
CBS; and NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the modern 
era’s rule of reason was honed to focus on specific, core economic concepts, 
especially anticompetitive effect and efficiency.”).  
143 Leslie, supra note 18, at 290. 
144 See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) 
(circumventing Dr. Miles to approve a genuine agency model); White Motor Co. 
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 265–66 (1963) (finding that per se analysis of 
vertical restraints is justified only when the Court possesses a long-held 
understanding of the market); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
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has begun to favor the rule of reason, but also that it recognizes 
horizontal and vertical arrangements may have very different 
causes and effects. Even though antitrust law has seen an ongoing 
“erosion of the per se rule,”145 a further extension of the rule of 
reason is required to account for instances of beneficial horizontal 
price arrangements such as the one in United States v. Apple, Inc. 
This rule-of-reason analysis must depart from earlier models by 
taking into account, among other factors, the benefits of economic 
efficiency. 
 
B. Market Efficiency as the Best Indicator of Consumer 
Welfare 
 
The incorrect notion that competition alone should guide 
antitrust law is deeply ingrained in the earliest antitrust cases.146 In 
Standard Oil, for instance, the Supreme Court held that only 
“anticompetitive” arrangements are invalid under the Sherman 
Act.147 “Consequently, the effect on competition soon became the 
primary, if not sole, focus determining the reasonableness of a 
                                                          
36, 57 (1977) (reversing Schwinn and finding that non-price vertical 
arrangements are better judged by the rule of reason); Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) (finding that “it is 
necessary to examine, in the first instance, the economic effects of vertical 
agreements to fix minimum resale prices[,] and to determine whether the per se 
rule is nonetheless appropriate.”). 
145 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1757–58. 
146 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 97 (1911); 
Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 
1986); see also BORK, supra note 46, at 7 (“There are many problems here, but 
perhaps the core of the difficulty is that the courts, and particularly the Supreme 
Court, have failed to understand and give proper weight to the crucial concept of 
business efficiency.”).  
147 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (“Without going into detail, and but very 
briefly surveying the whole field, it may be with accuracy said that the dread of 
enhancement of prices and of other wrongs which it was thought would flow 
from the undue limitation on competitive conditions caused by contracts or other 
acts of individuals or corporations led, as a matter of public policy, to the 
prohibition or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably 
restrictive of competitive conditions . . . .”). 
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challenged trade restraint.”148 This misperception has guided 
antitrust policy for the last hundred years, but no longer is it 
blindly accepted.149 Courts now realize that market efficiency is a 
relevant measure of antitrust policy and the best way to promote 
consumer welfare.150  
Only recently has economic theory considered the idea that 
efficiency is the goal of antitrust law.151 This theory arises from the 
Chicago School, which Judges Bork and Posner first applied to 
antitrust law in the 1970s.152 According to the Chicago School, 
efficiency is the chief object of the Sherman Act.153 “Because 
efficiency is the maximization of social utility, the Chicago 
School’s standard is often called the ‘consumer welfare’ 
standard.”154 Thus, the efficiency standard, by maximizing 
consumer welfare, is aligned with the true goal of the Sherman 
Act.155 
According to the Chicago School, competition and efficiency 
are not synonymous: in fact, competition can sometimes be 
                                                          
148 Leslie, supra note 18, at 245. 
149 Id. at 244. 
150 Id. 
151 See Gavil, supra note 74, at 735 (“The various frameworks of the new 
rules of reason are all animated by a common purpose: to differentiate 
anticompetitive from efficient conduct . . . . In application, these ‘new rules of 
reason’ have more economic content and more of a defined legal framework 
than did the seemingly more abstract Standard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade 
approach.”). 
152 See generally BORK, supra note 46; POSNER, supra note 66; Robert H. 
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division II, 75 YALE L. REV. 373 (1965); Posner, Antitrust Policy, supra note 
123.  
153 Leslie, supra note 18, at 250. See also BORK, supra note 46, at xi.  
154 Leslie, supra note 18, at 251. 
155 See BORK, supra note 46, at 78, 262. Bork contends that “the only 
legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare,” so that 
“[t]he responsibility of the federal courts for the integrity and virtue of law 
requires that they take consumer welfare as the sole value that guides decisions.” 
Id. at 51. Moreover, Bork warns that “[w]hen efficiency is not counted, or when 
it is seen as a positive evil, it appears that no business structure of behavior has 
any potential for social good, and there is consequently no reason to uphold its 
legality if any remote danger can be imagined.” Id. at 8. 
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inefficient.156 This is because while efficiency is an end in itself, 
competition is just one possible means of achieving it.157 
Businesses often enhance their efficiency more effectively by 
collaborating with—and thus by limiting their competition with—
other businesses.158 Courts that persist in elevating competition 
over efficiency are therefore guilty of overemphasizing the means 
and shortchanging the real end of antitrust law: consumer 
welfare.159 If the purpose of antitrust laws is to preserve market 
efficiency, sometimes competition must be set aside. Otherwise, a 
“blind obedience to competition is simply bad economics.”160  
The Supreme Court has previously questioned the sanctity of 
relying only on the competition standard.  In Northern Securities 
Co. v. United States,161 Justice Holmes dissented: “The court 
below argued as if maintaining competition were the expressed 
object of the act. The act says nothing about competition.”162 Like 
Taft in Addyston Pipe, Holmes argued that it is lawful to abolish 
competition in the service of efficiency.163 Justice Brandeis, in 
                                                          
156 Leslie, supra note 18, at 271. 
157 Professor Bork distinguishes competition from efficiency by stating that 
the former “is inherently a process in which rivals seek to exclude one another,” 
while efficiency “tends to exclude firms that are less efficient.” BORK, supra 
note 46, at 49. Moreover, Judge Posner has held that the emphasis of antitrust 
has shifted from “the protection of competition as a process of rivalry to the 
protection of competition as a means of promoting economic efficiency.” 
Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 
1986). See also Leslie, supra note 18, at 255 (“Competition and allocative 
efficiency . . . maintain a strict means-end relationship. Competition is a means 
to achieve allocative efficiency.”). 
158 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1768. 
159 Leslie, supra note 18, at 271. 
160 Id. 
161 N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
162 Id. at 403. 
163 Id. at 406. (“[Section 1], taken alone, does not require that all existing 
competitions shall be maintained. It does not look primarily, if at all, to 
competition. It simply requires that a party’s freedom in trade between the states 
shall not be cut down by contract with a stranger. So far as that phrase goes, it is 
lawful to abolish competition by any form of union.”). Similarly, Judge Taft 
held that “to be ancillary, and hence lawful, an agreement eliminating 
competition must be subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate 
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Chicago Board, offered the pithiest refutation of competition, 
stating simply, “the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot 
be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains 
competition.”164 
Today, some lower courts and commentators recognize that 
efficiency is the “appropriate objective when analyzing antitrust 
issues.”165 Although the Supreme Court has been slow in coming 
around, key cases demonstrate its willingness to consider 
efficiency.166 For instance, in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United 
States, a case concerning the struggling coal industry, the Court 
upheld the manufacturers’ restraint on prices on efficiency 
grounds.167 Similarly, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
the Court found that non-price vertical restrictions168  limiting the 
number of franchise retailers that sold Sylvania’s electronic 
products were legal when they allowed “the manufacturer to 
                                                          
transaction.” BORK, supra note 46, at 27. This occurred when “the elimination 
of competition was a means of creating efficiency.” Id. at 264. 
164 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918). 
165 Leslie, supra note 18, at 252 (“[C]ourts, commentators, and even critics 
have more or less reached a consensus that efficiency is the appropriate 
objective when analyzing anti-trust issues.”). 
166 For examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has deemed 
considerations of efficiency irrelevant to antitrust law, see Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (“Whatever economic 
justification particular to price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the 
law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (finding that the rule of 
reason “is not to decide whether a policy of favoring competition is in the public 
interest”). 
167 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), 
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984). Much like the Apple case, Appalachian Coals concerned a group of 
struggling producers (in this case, coal producers rather than book publishers) 
who instituted price restraints on their products in order to improve the 
efficiency of the market.  
168 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977) 
(describing the central vertical non-price restraint as follows: “Franchise 
agreements between manufacturers and retailers . . . includ[ed] provisions 
barring the retailers from selling franchised products from certain locations other 
than those specified in the agreements.”). 
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achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products.”169 
Additionally, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast 
Systems, a television network brought an antitrust action against 
music licensors, claiming that the model under which the licensors 
set fees for blanket licenses to perform musical compositions 
constituted illegal price fixing.170 Nonetheless, the Court sustained 
the horizontal restraint because it would “increase economic 
efficiency.”171 Indeed, many federal appellate courts have already 
recognized that efficiency is the goal of antitrust law, and 
competition simply a means to that end.172 However, the Supreme 
Court has not yet followed suit. “[T]he Court must do more than 
merely acknowledge the means-end relationship between 
competition and . . . efficiency.”173 In order to ensure maximization 
of consumer welfare, courts must adopt efficiency as the primary 
goal of antitrust policy.    
                                                          
169 Id. at 57. Much like the book publishers in the Apple case, Sylvania 
abandoned the wholesale model for a franchise sales model permitting it to pick 
which retailers sold its products and under what terms sales were to be 
conducted. See id. at 38–39.  
170 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
171 Id. at 20. The Court noted the importance of considering whether a price 
restraint tends to “threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-
market economy” or whether it is “one designed to ‘increase economic 
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.’” Id. As we 
will see, the publishers’ price restraints in the Apple case both promoted the 
proper operation of the market and made it more competitive, namely by ending 
Amazon’s monopoly and allowing Apple to enter the e-book market.  
172 Leslie, supra note 18, at 255. See also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. 
W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986); Rothery Storage & Van 
Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
173 Leslie, supra note 18, at 274. 
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III. HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS PROMOTING EFFICIENCY ARE 
SUBJECT TO THE RULE OF REASON 
 
It is no longer a viable policy for courts and regulators to 
consider horizontal price-fixing the “epitome of a per se 
violation.”174 As we have seen, the Sherman Act “has great 
generality and adaptability.”175 Antitrust law is apt to change as the 
courts extend the rule of reason to conduct once presumed 
illegal.176 The Supreme Court has already adjusted its policy 
regarding vertical restraints; it overruled Dr. Miles and recognized 
that retail-price maintenance is subject to evaluation under the rule 
of reason.177 The same adjustment must be made for horizontal 
price fixing. 
Supreme Court precedent supports such an argument. In 
Chicago Board of Trade, the Court, for the first time, upheld an 
apparent horizontal price-fixing arrangement under the rule of 
reason.178 Justice Brandeis found that the result of the Board’s 
price fixing “had actually been to improve market conditions.”179 
Fifteen years later, in Appalachian Coals, the Court again upheld a 
horizontal price-fixing arrangement.180 In that case, coal producers 
                                                          
174 Id. at 246. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 
150, 223 (1940) (finding per se illegal any “combination formed for the purpose 
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price 
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
175 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933), 
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984). 
176 See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 65, § 2:9 (“The distinction 
between practices deemed per se illegal, and those that are instead to be judged 
by the rule of reason or by some intermediate standard, is anything but 
immutable . . . practices that have at one time been analyzed under one test have 
later been brought under an altogether different standard.”). 
177 Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 908 (2007). 
178 Leslie, supra note 18, at 260 (arguing that the Court sustained a 
restriction that “amounted to, at the least, a variation of price-fixing”). 
179 BORK, supra note 46, at 44.  
180 Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 378; see also Leslie, supra note 18, at 
261 (“[T]he Court sustained an agreement which was, for all intents and 
purposes, a horizontal price-fixing agreement.”). 
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created an “exclusive selling agency” to increase coal production, 
“achieve economies in marketing,” and eliminate “destructive 
trade practices.”181 The Court declined to apply the per se rule,182 
effectively sustaining the arrangement because it purportedly 
corrected market failures in the coal industry and led to the “more 
economic sale of coal.”183 Echoing Brandeis in Chicago Board of 
Trade, the Court examined the “conditions peculiar to the coal 
industry” when it determined the ultimate purpose and effect of the 
horizontal restraint.184 The Court thereby found that the restraint 
“mitigated recognized evils” unique to the industry.185 The Court 
did not explicitly say as much, but an “efficiency exception to the 
per se rule doctrine was being carved out.”186  
Recent cases have begun to embrace the notion that economic 
efficiency justifies price-setting.187  The 1970s saw the Court begin 
to adjust its traditional per se approach in order to provide 
defendants an occasion to explain their economic rationale for 
horizontal restrictions on price.188 In the most important of these 
cases, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., the Court held that defendants’ price restriction on blanket 
music licenses ought to be examined under a rule-of-reason 
analysis.189 Tellingly, the Court noted that “easy labels do not 
always supply ready answers,”190 and found that not all price 
restrictions among competitors are “per se violations of the 
Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints.”191  
In applying the rule of reason to the defendants’ price-fixing 
scheme, the Court made two essential points. First, it held that 
                                                          
181 Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 358. 
182 Id. at 360–61; see also Leslie, supra note 18, at 262. 
183 Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 367. 
184 Id. at 368. 
185 Id. at 367. 
186 Leslie, supra note 18, at 262. 
187 Id. at 260. 
188 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1781. 
189 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). 
190 Id. at 8.  
191 Id. at 23.  
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special attention must be paid when conditions are “sui generis”192 
and therefore, that the Sherman Act should be “discriminatingly 
applied in light of economic realities.”193 In this respect, Broadcast 
Music, Inc. echoes early decisions194 and presages later ones195 in 
requiring that the Court tailor its analysis to the relevant market.196 
When the market is unique, the rule of reason is appropriate.197 
Second, the Court applied the nuanced economic-effects test198 in 
                                                          
192 Id. at 10 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 562 F.2d at 132). 
193 Id. at 14 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition 
for Certiori at 10–11, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 88 S.Ct. 761 (1968) 
(No. 147)).  
194 See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933) 
(“[A] close and objective scrutiny of particular conditions and purposes is 
necessary in each case. Realities must dominate the judgment.”); Bd. of Trade of 
Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[T]he court must ordinarily 
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied . . . 
.”). 
195 See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) 
(“[T]he factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether 
a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint 
on competition.”); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) 
(“‘[R]ule of reason’ normally requires an ascertainment of the fact peculiar to 
the particular business.”). 
196 See White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 265–66 (“To gauge the 
appropriateness of a per se test for the forms of restraint involved in this case, 
then, we must determine whether experience warrants, at this stage, a conclusion 
that inquiry into effect upon competition and economic justification would be 
similarly irrelevant.”); GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 57 (“[V]ertical 
restrictions [cannot] be conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the 
business excuse for their use.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
197 As we will see, this idea is again echoed in a later district court case, 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 763 (D. Del. 1981), 
which stated that the “public goods” market is unique and therefore deserving of 
rule-of-reason analysis. See also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) 
(“Per se treatment is appropriate once experience with a particular kind of 
restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will 
condemn it. Thus, we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with 
regard to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the 
economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.”) (citation 
omitted). 
198 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) 
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order to determine whether defendants’ conduct was an ancillary 
agreement intended to increase economic efficiency.199 The Court 
found that the “blanket license” was not a “naked restrain[t] of 
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition . . . but rather 
accompan[ied] the integration of sales, monitoring, and 
enforcement against unauthorized copyright use.”200 Thus, 
Broadcast Music, Inc. instructs courts to look beyond competition 
to whether the arrangement creates an efficiency to which a price-
restraint is ancillary. “In other words, the issue is whether the price 
fixing ‘achieve[s] purposes unrelated to price formation.’”201   
Two later decisions also applied the rule of reason to horizontal 
restraints. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, members of the NCAA 
limited the number of college football games that could be 
broadcast during a given athletic season, effectively restraining 
“the ability of member institutions to compete in terms of price and 
output.”202 The Court once again applied an economic-effects test 
and considered the unique nature of the relevant market.203 It found 
that the quality of the NCAA’s “product” (i.e., college football as a 
commercial product) could not be preserved “except by mutual 
agreement,” and that the NCAA played a “vital role” in preserving 
                                                          
(“[O]ur inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to 
show effect . . . the purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation 
of our predominantly free-market economy . . . .”). 
199 Id. at 20. See also Leslie, supra note 18, at 264–65 (“[T]he [BMI] Court 
acknowledged that competition is not the sole objective of the Sherman Act. 
Rather, there are times when competition must give way to productive efficiency 
concerns.”). 
200 Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
201 Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 599 (11th Cir. 
1986) (quoting United States v. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 
F.2d 469, 479 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
202 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 103 (1984). 
203 Id. at 104 n.26 (“Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into 
market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive 
conduct.”). 
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the integrity and character of the product.204 As in previous cases, 
the Court was guided by an interest in promoting economic 
efficiency.205 This principle appeared again in F.T.C. v. Indiana 
Federation of Dentists.206 Here an affiliation of dentists agreed to 
withhold certain records from insurance-claims examiners, who 
used the records to determine whether payment should be made on 
claims.207 Eventually, the Federal Trade Commission brought suit 
against the federation of dentists, claiming that its withholding 
documents amounted to “an unfair method of competition.”208 The 
Court noted that while the dentists’ conduct did resemble a “group 
boycott,” which the Court had in the past found “unlawful under 
the per se rule,” the Court here declined to apply the per se 
analysis.209 Instead, the Court employed the rule-of-reason 
standard210 and, as in previous cases, held that economic efficiency 
may justify anticompetitive restraints.211  
The prenominate cases, from Chicago Board to Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, support the proposition that the Supreme 
Court, like other federal courts, has begun to carve out an 
exception to the per se rule recognizing the benefit of certain 
horizontal price arrangements. Specifically, the Court seems more 
likely to apply the traditional rule of reason when a horizontal 
arrangement corrects a market failure in a unique industry and thus 
acts as an ancillary agreement intended to increase overall 
                                                          
204 Id. at 102. It may be easily argued that book publishers play an identical 
role in preserving the character and quality of their products: books. Amazon 
may threaten to replace publishers—but Amazon is, above all else, a consumer-
goods retailer. There is much reason to doubt Amazon’s ability to produce 
quality books when it is more interested in selling home goods and electronics.   
205 See Leslie, supra note 18, at 266 (arguing that “the Court in NCAA took 
a price-fixing scheme out of the per se category because of the potential for 
productive efficiency”); Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 
76, at 1758 (noting that in NCAA “the Supreme Court extended the rule of 
reason to other horizontal agreements with potential efficiency justifications”). 
206 F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
207 Id. at 449. 
208 Id. at 451–52. 
209 Id. at 457–60. 
210 Id. at 459. 
211 See Leslie, supra note 18, at 266. 




IV. THE APPEALS COURT SHOULD APPLY A NEW THREE-PRONG 
ECONOMIC-EFFECTS TEST TO UNITED STATES V. APPLE, INC. 
 
As argued by Professor Leslie, the “net effect” of the 
prenominate decisions “is that the per se rule against horizontal 
price-fixing is not intact.”212 In conjunction with one another, these 
cases suggest that a horizontal price arrangement may be legal 
under the rule of reason when the relevant market is unique,213 the 
restraint is ancillary to a proper agreement,214 and when the 
agreement promotes economic efficiency.215 Thus, on appeal, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should evaluate 
United States v. Apple, Inc. not only under the rule of reason, but 
more specifically under a new three-part economic-effects test 
reflecting, in the most concise way possible, the above precedent. 
This test differs from the traditional test in two ways. First, unlike 
the current rule-of-reason analysis, it would be uniformly applied 
to instances of horizontal arrangements. Second, the new test 
would replace the more general inquiries of the traditional test, 
which typically includes “inherent nature,” “inherent effect,” and 
“evident purpose” prongs.216 Under this new test, the court would 
instead consider whether (1) the publishing industry and e-book 
                                                          
212 Id. at 267. 
213 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U.S. 253, 261 (1963); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 
763 (D. Del. 1981).  
214 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. at 20; Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. 
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 599 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. 
S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469, 479 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
215 See F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Na’'l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 
(1984); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. at 1; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. 
United States 288 U.S. 344 (1933), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).  
216 See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.  
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market are unique or unfamiliar; (2) the publishers’ price restraint 
was ancillary to the creation of a proper agency model; and (3) the 
arrangement improved efficiency and promoted consumer 
welfare.217 This standard is not derived from thin air; rather, it is a 
formalization of modern economics and myriad case law. Because 
the price-fixing arrangement between book publishers in United 
States v. Apple, Inc. satisfies these requirements, the Second 
Circuit  should find it legal under the rule of reason.  
 
A. Under the Sui Generis Prong the E-Book Market is Unique  
 
Under the first prong of the proposed test, the court would 
determine whether the e-book market is unique. As discussed 
above, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply the per se 
rule when dealing with a unique economic market or an industry 
with which the judiciary lacks experience.218 The Court has held 
                                                          
217 HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 65, § 2:11. 
218 See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text. See also State Oil Co. 
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Per se treatment is appropriate once experience 
with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence 
that the rule of reason will condemn it. Thus, we have expressed reluctance to 
adopt per se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the context of business 
relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately 
obvious.”) (citation omitted); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 
441 U.S. 1, 10–14 (1979) (When market conditions are “sui generis,” the 
Sherman Act should be “discriminatingly applied in light of economic 
realities.”); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977) 
(Vertical restrictions cannot be “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and 
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have 
caused or the business excuse for their use.”) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 265–66 (1963) 
(“To gauge the appropriateness of a per se test for the forms of restraint involved 
in this case, then, we must determine whether experience warrants, at this stage, 
a conclusion that inquiry into effect upon competition and economic justification 
would be similarly irrelevant.”); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 
U.S. 344, 361 (1933) (“It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider the 
economic conditions peculiar to the coal industry . . . .”), overruled by 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Bd. of 
Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“To determine that 
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied . . . .”); Broad. Music, Inc., v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 
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instead that when market conditions are “sui generis,”219 the 
Sherman Act should be “discriminatingly applied in light of 
economic realities.”220 Because the e-book market is highly 
unusual, the publishers’ horizontal arrangement is best evaluated 
pursuant to the rule of reason. Under the rule of reason, publishers 
would have the opportunity to explain their rationale for a 
horizontal restriction on price.221  
The e-book market is unique for three reasons. First, e-books 
are “public goods” defined by two basic characteristics.222 First, 
“unlike private goods (e.g., apples), one can use a public good 
without leaving any less for others to consume.”223 Because e-
books are electronic files downloaded by consumers, they can be 
purchased and read indefinitely without ever going out of print.224 
Thus, one person downloading an e-book has no effect on 
another’s ability to purchase the same title. In economic terms, 
once an e-book file is created, the marginal cost of additional 
consumption is near zero.225 “The second characteristic of a public 
good is that it is difficult to exclude persons who do not pay from 
using the good.”226 Just as piracy was once a critical concern for 
the music industry, it now threatens book publishers.227 This is 
largely because e-books are small files that can be downloaded 
                                                          
F. Supp. 758, 763–765 (D. Del. 1981) (holding that the “public goods” market is 
unique and therefore deserving of rule-of-reason analysis).  
219 Columbia Broad., 441 U.S. at 10. 
220 Id. at 14 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition 
for Certiori at 10–11, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Pub’g Corp., 372 F.2d 1, 5 (9th 
Cir. 1967) ( No. 20074)).  
221 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1781. 
222 Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. at 763.  
223 Id. 
224 See Rave Uno, Why Will eBooks Replace Traditional Books?, BUZZLE 
(May 16, 2012), http://www.buzzle.com/articles/why-ebooks-will-replace-
traditional-books.html. 
225 Cf. Moor-Law, 527 F. Supp. at 763. 
226 Id. 
227 See Rob Reid, What To Do When Attacked by Pirates: Music, Books 
and Online Piracy, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702303552104577438212250619458.html. 
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easily.228 Indeed, at least one study has shown a rise in e-book 
piracy as the number of e-reader platforms has increased.229 Today, 
“[c]ountless unlicensed e-books can be found online, and millions 
of people use them.”230 The indefinite supply of e-books, along 
with low marginal costs and increasing demand for pirated files, 
has ramifications for the e-book market. In short, the “public 
goods” status of e-books means that “the natural market forces of 
supply and demand do not operate normally on pricing . . . .”231  
Second, the e-book industry is unique because e-books are not 
interchangeable goods. In a typical antitrust case, a market 
comprises products, such as widgets, that have “reasonable 
interchangeability.”232 Two products are interchangeable when 
there is sufficient “cross-elasticity of demand”233—that is, when 
“consumers would respond to a slight increase in the price of one 
product by switching to another product.”234 But in the e-book 
market, cross-elasticity does not always exist. This is because each 
book publisher possesses a unique catalog of specific authors, and 
authors are not interchangeable.235 Unlike widgets, most authors 
                                                          
228 See David Carnoy, Kindle E-book Piracy Accelerates, CNET (Feb. 18, 
2011), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-18438_7-20033437-82.html (“E-books are 
small files and 2,500 of them can be packed into a single download (Torrent) 
that’s only about 3.4GB.”). 
229 See David Carnoy, New Study Suggests e-Book Piracy is on the Rise, 
CNET (Oct. 6, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-20018831-1.html. 
Technology company Attributor released a second study in 2010, which 
indicated a fifty percent increase in online searches for pirated downloads 
throughout 2010, a twenty percent increase in demand for pirated downloads 
since the iPad became available in May 2010, and fifty-four percent increase in 
pirated e-book demand between August 2009 and October 2010. Id. 
230 Reid, supra note 227. 
231 Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. at 764 (finding that the public-good status 
of musical compositions rendered typical supply-and-demand analysis 
inapplicable). 
232 AD/SAT v. Assoc. Press, 181 F.3d 216, 227 (2d Cir. 1999). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 One might argue, of course, that there is little difference between 
authors of bestselling potboilers or generic legal thrillers. But such an 
assessment overlooks the phenomenon of “reader loyalty.” As anyone who has a 
favorite writer knows, there is no substitute for a unique voice. A reader 
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can be easily differentiated: they write books with a particular 
style, theme, or subject matter.236 If consumers wish to read an 
author’s new book, they can purchase it only from the author’s 
exclusive publisher. Should that publisher wish to increase the 
book’s price, consumers are seldom able to purchase an 
“interchangeable” item from a competitor. Moreover, many 
readers, loyal to a particular author, would simply prefer to 
purchase a desired book at a slightly higher price than to buy 
another book at a slightly lower price. Again, because there is less 
cross-elasticity in the e-book market, the standard forces of supply 
and demand do not function as they would in a more elastic 
market. 
Finally, the e-book market is unique because book publishers 
(manufacturers) maintain a peculiar dual-relationship with Amazon 
(a distributor and manufacturer). Beginning with its launch in 
1995, Amazon has always operated as a book retailer.237 Amazon’s 
website began by selling deeply discounted print books to its 
online customers.238 In November 2007, Amazon started selling e-
books on its Kindle device as well.239 Throughout this period, 
Amazon maintained a typical—if somewhat strained—relationship 
with book publishers: the publishers manufactured books, and 
Amazon sold them. This changed in October 2011, however, when 
Amazon launched its own New York publishing arm.240 By hiring 
                                                          
enamored of the author George Saunders, for example, will scoff at the notion 
that he is “interchangeable” with another contemporary writer. This is one 
reason that popular authors are able to attract and maintain a loyal readership 
while others are not. Indeed, having a unique voice is, in large part, what makes 
an author marketable in the first place. 
236 Works of fiction, from Homer’s Odyssey to Joyce’s Ulysses, are unique, 
inimitable artworks. Non-fiction books, too, often contain unique factual 
information or analysis not found elsewhere.  
237 BRANDT, supra note 1, at 69, 82. 
238 Id. at 82. 
239 Id. at 139. 
240 David Streitfeld, Amazon Signs Up Authors, Writing Book Publishers 
Out of Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/ 
17/technology/amazon-rewrites-the-rules-of-book-publishing.html [hereinafter 
Streitfeld, Amazon Signs Up Authors]. In October 2010, before the official 
launch of its publishing arm, Amazon had already begun to offer royalties of 
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editors, wooing authors, and producing original print and e-books, 
Amazon became both a manufacturer and distributor.241 Thus, 
operating simultaneously as the publishers’ distributor and, oddly, 
as their competitor,242 Amazon encroached on services typically 
provided by traditional publishers.243 This created an 
unprecedented set of circumstances that continues to pose an 
existential threat to publishers.244 Because Amazon is the primary 
                                                          
seventy “percent to authors who self-publish[ed] through the Kindle store.” 
BRANDT, supra note 1, at 144. 
241 Amazon published 122 books during its inaugural season. See Streitfeld, 
Amazon Signs Up Authors, supra note 240. In June 2012, the company 
purchased Avalon Books, a small publisher with a backlist of 3,000 titles. See 
Julie Bosman, Amazon Buys Avalon Books, Publisher in Romance  
and Mysteries, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2012/06/04/amazon-buys-avalon-books-publisher-in-romance-and-
mysteries/ [hereinafter Bosman, Amazon Buys Avalon Books]. 
242 The DOJ, in its Competitive Impact Statement, fails to acknowledge 
Amazon’s dual role as retailer and manufacturer. Rather, the government treats 
Amazon as a pure retailer. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 
13. To wit, the government proposes prohibiting publishers from retaliating 
should Amazon again decide to sell their e-books at a deeply discounted price. 
See id. But this is unrealistic, as Amazon is not only a retailer but a book 
publisher, i.e., a direct competitor of the settling defendants. The DOJ’s 
prohibition is thus akin to allowing Random House to sell Macmillan’s e-books 
at $0.01 per copy, while depriving Macmillan of any competitive recourse. The 
inverse of this peculiar relationship may be seen in Amazon’s strained 
relationship with traditional book retailers like Barnes & Noble. Now that 
Amazon is a publisher as well as a distributor, Barnes & Noble has begun 
refusing to carry Amazon’s print books. See David Streitfeld, Booksellers 
Resisting Amazon’s Disruption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/11/05/technology/shunning-amazon-booksellers-resist-a-
transformation.html [hereinafter Streitfield, Booksellers Resisting]. 
243 Streitfeld, Amazon Signs Up Authors, supra note 240. 
244 One may argue that chain retailers have been doing for decades what 
Amazon started doing only last year. Indeed, some retail stores—e.g., Wal-mart, 
Whole Foods, Target—manufacture and sell their own “store brand” consumer 
products alongside the “name brands” manufactured by other companies. Like 
Amazon, these retailers wear two hats: they compete with manufacturers for 
market share while distributing the manufacturers’ goods.  There is, however, a 
fundamental difference between retail stores and Amazon: while store-brand 
tissue-paper competes against name-brand tissue-paper in an elastic market 
where both products are virtually interchangeable in terms of quality and 
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distributor of e-books, however, individual publishers have been 
unable to take competitive measures without jeopardizing the sales 
of their own books.245 This double-bind, unusual among economic 
markets, demands special attention from the court.246 
In summary, the distinctive “public goods” status of e-books, 
the unusual inelasticity of e-book demand, and Amazon’s peculiar 
double-role as both retailer and manufacturer render the e-book 
market sui generis. It is alarming, therefore, that Judge Cote, in her 
Opinion & Order, declined to follow Supreme Court precedent and 
apply the rule of reason.247  Even more surprising, while Judge 
Cote acknowledged that United States v. Apple, Inc. is an unusual 
case,248 she did not require the DOJ to submit even a single 
economic study to support its allegations or demonstrate an 
adequate understanding of the market.249 The absence of any 
                                                          
ingredients, Amazon seeks to create unique public goods by wooing popular 
authors away from publishing houses. See, e.g., Christine Park, Name Brands vs. 
Store Brands, ABC30 (Sept. 9, 2013), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/ 
story?id=9227042. The stakes are much higher. Because readers are loyal to 
certain authors (i.e., authors are not interchangeable), and there is a finite 
“supply” of authors, stealing authors from a publisher constitutes a substantial 
blow to its business. A consumer-goods manufacturer can always improve 
competition by adjusting product price, marketing strategy, quality of product, 
etc. But a publishing house deprived of its bestselling authors—the product 
itself—can no longer compete at all. Once drained of its most valuable resource, 
a publisher will simply cease to exist.  
245 When Macmillan, one of New York’s “Big Six” book publishers, first 
attempted to persuade Amazon to adopt an agency pricing model in early 2010, 
Amazon reacted by pulling all of Macmillan’s books from its Web site. See Brad 
Stone & Motoko Rich, Amazon Removes Macmillan Books, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/technology/30amazon.html.  
This was clearly a competitive maneuver—aimed at injuring Macmillan—given 
extraordinary bite by Amazon’s status as the primary retailer of e-books. 
246 The court ought to recognize that the publishers’ horizontal arrangement 
was meant to mitigate the “recognized evils” of Amazon, as the coal producers 
in Appalachian Coals were permitted to fend off the evils in the coal industry.  
247 United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 630–41 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
248 Id. at 634 (“Clearly, this is no ordinary Tunney Act proceeding.”). 
249 Id. at 633 (acknowledging that “the Government did not submit any 
economic studies to support its allegations”). 
 THROWING THE E-BOOK AT PUBLISHERS 383 
 
financial analysis or evidentiary hearing250 betrays the 
government’s lack of familiarity with the complexities of the 
publishing industry and the e-book market in particular. Since the 
e-book market is “sufficiently unusual” and the court’s experience 
“sufficiently sparse,”251 the circumstances of this case satisfy the 
first prong of the new three-part economic effects test. 
 
B. Under the Ancillary Restraint Prong the Publishers’ 
Horizontal Agreement is Ancillary to a Proper Agreement  
 
Under the second prong of the proposed economic-effects test, 
the court would determine whether the relevant restraint is 
ancillary to a proper agreement. This analysis recalls Taft’s 
decision in Addyston Pipe, whereby “showing that a restraint is 
ancillary . . . lifts it out of the per se category and subjects it to the 
tests of the rule of reason . . . .”252 Thus, demonstrating the 
appropriateness of rule-of-reason analysis requires showing that 
the restraint is ancillary to “the main purpose of a lawful 
contract”253 that benefits consumers.254 This doctrine is easily 
applied to the horizontal price fixing found in United States v. 
Apple, Inc.255 Here, agreements between publishers to set e-book 
                                                          
250 Id.  
251 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc. 527 F. Supp. 758, 764–65 (D. 
Del. 1981) (finding that when “the market is sufficiently unusual and the Court’s 
experience with the challenged practice sufficiently sparse that one cannot 
confidently characterize the defendants’ conduct as ‘plainly anticompetitive’ and 
very likely without ‘redeeming virtue’ . . . . [T]he Rule of Reason analysis is 
appropriate.”) (citation omitted). 
252 BORK, supra note 46, at 267. 
253 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 
1898), aff’d as modified, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 
211 (1899). 
254 Id. at 281 (“Contracts for the partial restraint of trade are upheld, not 
because they are advantageous to the individual with whom the contract is 
made, and a sacrifice pro tanto of the rights of the community, but because it is 
for the benefit of the public at large that they should be enforced.”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
255 See BORK, supra note 46, at 264 (“The legal doctrine necessary to the 
correct treatment of price-fixing and market division cases is already at hand in 
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prices would be harmful unless ancillary to another end.256 More 
specifically, it would be illegal per se to set e-book prices “only 
when the restraint is ‘naked’—that is, only when the agreement is 
not ancillary to cooperative productive activity engaged in by the 
agreeing parties.”257 As we will see, the horizontal agreement 
between publishers was entirely ancillary to a lawful and 
productive vertical arrangement, the agency pricing model.  
There is no question that publishers engaged in a horizontal 
agreement in order to establish an agency pricing model. The 
clearest indication of this is that Macmillan attempted to negotiate 
the agency model with Amazon before any collusive steps were 
taken by the rest of the publishers.258 This suggests that the 
publishers’ only aim was to establish a legal pricing system, rather 
than to arbitrarily raise e-book prices and increase revenue.259 
Moreover, both the DOJ and Judge Cote acknowledge that the 
alleged “collusion” between publishers was a means to establish 
agency pricing with retailers.260 Indeed, the government offers no 
evidence of further collusion once the agency model was set in 
place in January 2010. It is clear, therefore, that here, as in 
Broadcast Music, the horizontal arrangement between defendants 
was ancillary to a single and proper purpose.261 
                                                          
the concept of ancillary restraints.”). 
256 HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 65, § 2:9. 
257 BORK, supra note 46, at 262. 
258 See Stone & Rich, supra note 245. 
259 Indeed, certain commentators have noted that book publishers likely 
made less per book under the agency model. As Adam C. Engst has pointed out, 
overall earnings might have dropped by “as much as seventeen percent.” Adam 
C. Engst, Explaining the Apple Ebook Price Fixing Suit, TIDBITS (July 10, 
2013), http://tidbits.com/article/13912 (“Consider a $29.99 hardcover that Apple 
would sell for $14.99. The publisher would earn 70 percent of that, or roughly 
$10.50. But under the wholesale model, the publisher might have sold that book 
to Amazon for as much as $15.”)    
260 See United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (noting that “the Complaint alleges unlawful communications and 
industry collusion that gave rise to a series of agreements designed to ensure 
defendants’ use of agency pricing for e-books . . . .”). 
261 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) 
(finding that a blanket license was not a “naked restrain[t] of trade with no 
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The agency model adopted by publishers is completely legal. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the validity of vertical 
price maintenance, despite the confusion caused by Dr. Miles.262 
As discussed above, the Leegin court officially overruled Dr. 
Miles, finding that vertical retail-price maintenance often has pro-
competitive benefits.263  Vertical arrangements have since become 
difficult to prove illegal, and are often viewed by the courts as 
legal.264 Even the government contends that it “does not object to 
the agency method of distribution in the e-book industry . . . .”265 
Moreover, actual price maintenance cannot be said to exist when 
prices are established through a valid agency relationship,266 which 
is the case in United States v. Apple, Inc.  
 
C. Under the Efficiency Prong the Horizontal Agreement 
Creates Economic Efficiency in the E-book Market 
 
Under the third prong of the proposed economic-effects test, 
the court would consider what, if any, effects a business restraint 
has on economic efficiency in a particular market. As discussed 
earlier in Part II.B,267 market efficiency is the true measure of 
antitrust policy. Just as procompetitive restraints were once 
presumed legal, courts should recognize “a presumption in favor of 
the legality of those restraints that usually promote efficiency.”268 
                                                          
purpose except stifling of competition . . . but rather accompanies the integration 
of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use . . . .”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
262 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) 
(“We are of opinion, therefore, that there is nothing as a matter of principle or in 
the authorities which requires us to hold that genuine contracts of agency like 
those before us, however comprehensive as a mass or whole in their effect, are 
violations of the Anti-Trust Act.”). 
263 See supra Part I.B; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007). 
264 See KESSLER & WALLER, supra note 48.  
265 Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments, supra note 43, 
at 7.  
266 See KESSLER & WALLER, supra note 48. 
267 See supra Part II.B.  
268 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1755. A 
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At the very least, defendants must be given an opportunity to 
present a plausible efficiency defense by showing that a business 
restraint increases efficiency.269 Therefore, the courts’ task when 
evaluating such a restraint is to distinguish between arrangements 
that diminish efficiency and those that promote it.270 The 
horizontal retail-price agreement, as it was implemented by book 
publishers in April 2010, promoted efficiency in the e-book 
market.271 The publishers, therefore, should have the opportunity 
to explain their case in court.272  
Publishers acted to correct a problem wrought by Amazon, 
which created inefficiency by monopolizing the e-book market. 
“The offense of monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act has 
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the 
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”273  
First, Amazon possessed monopoly powers in the relevant 
market. It is undisputed that before the advent of the agency 
model, Amazon enjoyed a ninety-percent share of the e-book 
market,274 a fact which the government omits from both its 
                                                          
presumption of reasonableness is nothing new; in fact, it harkens back to Justice 
Brandeis’s opinion in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 
U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Justice Brandeis observed that “[e]very agreement 
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of 
their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is 
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether 
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” Id. 
269 Leslie, supra note 18, at 267. See also In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in 
Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988) (“[A] defense is plausible if it cannot be 
rejected without extensive factual inquiry.”). 
270 Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1768. 
271 See id. at 1780. 
272 See id. 
273 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
274 See, e.g., Comments of Barnes & Noble, Inc. on the Proposed Final 
Judgment at 9, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826); Hiltzick, supra note 14; Maher, supra note 12; 
Phillips, supra note 14. 
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briefs.275 The predominant size of Amazon’s market share was a 
clear indication of its monopoly power in the e-book market.276  
Second, Amazon maintained its market power through illegal 
methods—namely, predatory pricing. The Second Circuit has held 
that “[t]he relationship between a firm’s prices and its marginal 
costs provides the best single determinate of predatory pricing.”277 
Thus, contrary to the DOJ’s opinion, abundant evidence shows that 
Amazon was indeed guilty of predatory pricing before the advent 
of the agency model.278 Beginning with the launch of the Kindle in 
                                                          
275 The government appears completely unwilling to admit that by 2010, 
Amazon had monopolized the e-book market. Its contention that returning price 
discretion back to retailers will “allow competition to return to the market” 
therefore strains credulity. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 
12. That there was no competition before the agency model is obvious to anyone 
who examines the data. Moreover, any competition in the market today was a 
direct result of publishers ensuring that e-book prices remain remunerative, 
encouraging other retailers, like Barnes & Noble and Apple, to enter the market. 
276 See, e.g., Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (finding that an eighty-seven percent 
market share constituted “monopoly power”); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946) (finding that “over two-thirds” of the entire 
cigarette market constituted a “substantial monopoly”); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (1945) (finding that a ninety percent 
market share constituted market power). 
277 Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981). 
278 See BORK, supra note 46, at 144. 
Predation may be defined, provisionally, as a firm’s 
deliberate aggression against one or more rivals through the 
employment of business practices that would not be 
considered profit maximizing except for the expectation either 
that (1) rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the 
predator with a market share sufficient to command monopoly 
profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon 
competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or 
threatening.”). It is clear that Amazon’s pricing practices meet 
both requirements. Moreover, Amazon was in a unique 
position to subsidize low returns in the e-book market with 
higher returns in its profitable consumer-goods sales, thus 
giving it the ability to sell e-books at cut-rate prices for an 
indefinite period of time.  
Id.; see also Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related 
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 721 
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2007, Amazon sold e-books to consumers at a considerable loss.279 
Under the wholesale model, publishers sold copies of print- and e-
books to Amazon for roughly fifty percent of the list price of the 
printed edition.280 Amazon then offered many e-books—especially 
new releases and New York Times bestsellers—to consumers for a 
“cut-rate” price of $9.99.281 Thus, an e-book with a list price of 
$26.00 would be sold to Amazon for $13.00; Amazon in turn sold 
the title to consumers for $9.99—a marginal loss of $3.00.282 Other 
sources estimate that Amazon lost as much as $4.00 or $5.00 on 
every e-book it sold.283 Either way, assuming that Amazon’s 
marginal cost was no less than the wholesale cost of an e-book, it 
is clear that Amazon was pricing e-books well below marginal 
cost.284 Accordingly, pursuant to Second Circuit precedent, 
Amazon was clearly engaging in predatory pricing.285 Amazon 
also preserved its market power in a number of other questionable 
ways, including retaliating against publishers that attempted to take 
advantage of other e-books platforms; removing the online “buy” 
buttons for titles from publishers that did not agree to Amazon’s 
                                                          
(1975). 
279 Maher, supra note 12 (estimating that Amazon lost $35 million on e-
book sales through October 2009); see also Brief of Bob Kohn, supra note 11, at 
21; BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142. The government’s contention that “Amazon’s 
e-book distribution business has been consistently profitable” is inexplicable, as 
it is supported by neither economic analysis nor simple common sense. See, e.g., 
Complaint, supra note 3, at 9. Moreover, profitability is not relevant in a 
predatory-pricing analysis because it is not a proper indication of efficiency. See 
BORK, supra note 46, at 106 (arguing that efficiency “is not a concept 
coterminous with profitability. A firm may be profitable because it forms a 
cartel, merges to monopolistic size, or employs predatory tactics successfully. 
Profitability based upon such tactics is not evidence of productive efficiency 
because consumer welfare is lessened rather than increased. Profitability in such 
cases is based upon the disruption of allocative efficiency rather than the 
enhancement of productive efficiency.”). 
280 Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 3. 
281 Id.; see also BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142; Lacy, supra note 10. 
282 Brief of Bob Kohn, supra note 11, at 21. 
283 BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142; Lacy, supra note 10. 
284 Brief of Bob Kohn, supra note 11, at 22. 
285 Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (1981) (“[P]rices 
below reasonably anticipated marginal cost will be presumed illegal.”). 
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contractual terms; and pursuing exclusive distribution agreements 
with authors.286  
According to adherents of the Chicago School, the real 
problem with Amazon’s e-book monopoly was that it caused 
inefficiency.287 This is because the monopolist creates “a gap 
between marginal cost and price, which means that social costs and 
social desires are no longer equated.”288 By selling e-books at 
unremunerative prices, Amazon prevented rivals from entering the 
market and thereby stifled efficiency-creating innovation.289 More 
importantly, Amazon’s predatory pricing led to a market failure 
that caused overconsumption of e-books.290 Because e-books were 
sold at artificially low prices, more of them were purchased than 
could be efficiently produced.291 When viewed from a purely 
economic perspective, then, the publishers’ anxiety over “the $9.99 
problem” was entirely justified. Publishers were not simply 
worried about protecting their own profits; rather, as the Second 
Circuit has recognized, the type of predatory pricing perpetrated by 
Amazon, and its resultant inefficiency, directly threatened 
                                                          
286 United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
287 Leslie, supra note 18, at 250. See also BORK, supra note 46, at 101. 
288 BORK, supra note 46, at 101 (“The evil of monopoly, then, is not higher 
prices or smaller production (though these are its concomitants) but misallocated 
resources, or allocation inefficiency.”). 
289 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 278, at 698. Indeed, the DOJ 
recognizes that Apple was unable to enter the e-book market before the advent 
of the agency model because e-book prices were prohibitively low. This was 
not, as the DOJ claims, due to the “intense price competition that prevailed 
among e-book retailers in late 2009”—competition that did not exist given that 
Amazon held 90 percent of the market. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 3.  
Rather, it was due entirely to Amazon’s illegal predatory pricing, which also 
deterred other competitors, like Google, Barnes & Noble, and Zola Books from 
entering the market. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 639. 
290  See Leslie, supra note 18, at 268. 
291 The DOJ betrays a lack of economic understanding when it asserts that 
publishers’ agency model “prevented e-book retailers from experimenting with 
innovative pricing strategies that could efficiently respond to consumer 
demand.” Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 9. In fact, it was the 
publishers’ agreement that corrected the supply-demand curve by returning 
consumption to an efficient level.  
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consumer welfare.292 
The book publishers in United States v. Apple, Inc. acted 
efficiently (and legally) by correcting the market failure caused by 
Amazon’s predatory pricing of e-books.293 In order to understand 
why the publishers’ price-fixing arrangement was efficient, we 
must briefly consider the economic theory of the second best. 
According to Professors Lipsey and Lancaster in their seminal 
work on the matter, the general theory of the second best states that 
if optimal conditions of efficiency cannot be fulfilled, “a second 
best optimum situation is achieved only by departing from all other 
optimum conditions.”294 When there is a monopoly constraint on 
output, for instance, further constraints may be required to achieve 
a desirable situation.295 The theory of the second best thus suggests 
that if two market failures occur in a market and the government 
cannot resolve both of them, “it may be more efficient to leave the 
market unregulated despite the failures.”296 In other words, the 
theory of the second best turns on its head the old apothegm that 
two wrongs don’t make a right.297 By suggesting that, in the 
context of the e-book market, two wrongs can make a right, this 
theory effectively rebuts the DOJ’s contention that horizontal 
price-fixing is per se illegal even if it leads to an optimum 
situation.298 The theory of the second best also casts doubt on 
Judge Cote’s observation that “[t]he familiar mantra regarding 
‘two wrongs’ would seem to offer guidance in these 
circumstances.”299 
The theory of the second best holds that “[i]f two market 
                                                          
292 See Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 1981). 
293 See United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 163 F.3d 737, 741–42 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (“The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from 
the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the 
market.”) (quoting Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)). 
294 Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 57, at 48.  
295 Id. at 49. 
296 Leslie, supra note 18, at 268. 
297 Id. 
298 See Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments, supra note 
43, at 7. 
299 United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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failures exist simultaneously[,] one causing underconsumption and 
one causing overconsumption,” the failures will “balance each 
other and create a more efficient equilibrium than if antitrust 
enforcement eliminated only one market failure.”300 In this case, 
book publishers created a market failure—by promoting under-
consumption of e-books—to counteract the original market failure 
caused by Amazon. Because the DOJ declined to uphold optimum 
conditions by addressing the original Amazon market failure, 
publishers were left to re-establish efficiency by their own means, 
which included both vertical and horizontal pricing 
arrangements301 that eliminated monopolistic predatory pricing and 
allowed competition in the market. This conduct was completely 
legal under the Sherman Act, which is meant to eliminate 
inefficiencies in the market thereby promoting consumer 
welfare.302 Indeed, the publishers’ actions corrected the Amazon 
market failure, maximized efficiency, and therefore promoted the 




                                                          
300 Leslie, supra note 18, at 268–69. Leslie argues that “[a]ccording to the 
theory of the second best, when other market failures are also present the various 
failures may cancel each other out, so that nonenforcement of antitrust laws 
maximizes efficiency.” Id. at 244. 
301 To her credit, Judge Cote briefly acknowledged the possibility that 
Apple and the publishers were merely responding to the predatory pricing 
initiated by Amazon. However, by denying the Defendants an opportunity to 
explain the situation, Judge Cote cleaved too closely to the per se rule. See 
United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 2826, 2013 WL 3454986 at *58 
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013) (“If Apple is suggesting that Amazon was engaging in 
illegal, monopolistic practices, and that Apple’s combination with the Publisher 
Defendants to deprive a monopolist of some of its market power is pro-
competitive and healthy for our economy, it is wrong. This trial has not been the 
occasion to decide whether Amazon’s choice to sell NYT Bestsellers or other 
New Releases as loss leaders was an unfair trade practice or in any other way a 
violation of law. If it was, however, the remedy for illegal conduct is a 
complaint lodged with the proper law enforcement offices or a civil suit or 
both.”). 
302 Leslie, supra note 18, at 250. 
303 Id. at 283. 




By disregarding the true purpose of the Sherman Act, the 
District Court in United States v. Apple, Inc. did a profound 
disservice not only to the book-publishing industry, but to antitrust 
law at large. The court accomplished the very opposite of good 
policy: it chastened Apple and the publishers for seeking to restore 
efficiency to the e-book market, while permitting Amazon to re-
exert its monopolistic dominance through a return to predatory 
pricing. Yet there is still hope that the initial decision in United 
States v. Apple, Inc. represents a preamble to a happier, more 
satisfying story. The Second Circuit—and perhaps even the U.S. 
Supreme Court—will have an opportunity to rewrite the fate of the 
burgeoning e-book industry.  
In re-examining the business arrangements at the heart of 
United States v. Apple, Inc., the higher courts ought not only to 
extend the rule of reason to the horizontal arrangements in this 
case (as the lower court failed to do), but apply an improved three-
prong economic-effects test based on a contemporary 
understanding of economics. The courts should thus consider 
whether (1) the publishing industry and e-book markets are unique 
or unfamiliar; (2) the publishers’ price restraint was ancillary to the 
creation of a proper agency model; and (3) the arrangement 
improved efficiency and promoted consumer welfare. By applying 
this nuanced analysis, the higher courts will best advance the 
interests of the public and ensure that justice is served. Thus, while 
the first chapter of this story is complete, the book is far from 
finished.  
 
 
